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TWO ESSAYS ON THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SARBANES-OXLEY  
ON SMALL BANKS AND SMALL BUSINESSES 
By 
Earl C. Howell 
 
 These essays examine the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on small banks 
(Essay #1) and small businesses (Essay #2).  Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), passed in 2002 by 
the Congress of the United States, was intended to enhance the security of the public 
shareholder through extensive reporting and compliance programs.  As some compliance 
costs are fixed, the costs of SOX would logically fall disproportionately upon smaller 
banks, possibly producing unintended consequences.  These costs if significant may 
impact the bank’s choice of strategy.  How then can the bank respond?  The expectation 
of a negative impact on small banks is well documented, and consistent with this 
expectation I found that small public banks’ ratio of expense post Sox increased more 
than that of large public banks.  However pretax earnings for small listed banks post SOX 
compared to pre SOX was indistinguishable from that of large banks, suggestive of 
coping strategies.  However, I found that fewer small banks elected public reporting 
status post SOX, reflective of the higher perceived cost of public market membership and 
that a significant number of financial institutions elected to exit the public securities 
market.  Turning to the impact on small businesses, while small banks had reduced 
capital accumulation post SOX on a scale similar to that of large banks, the business 
lending of small listed banks was significantly higher than that of large banks. Small 
v 
businesses, which depend significantly upon small banks for their lending, are thus not 
potentially constrained in their growth efforts in the post SOX period, at least with 
respect to listed banks.  I find, in contrast with the direct effect of the costs of SOX, a 
significant impact upon small banks making a capital market decision.  The reduction in 
the number of banks electing public market membership is a shift in the small banking 
growth model and may suggest a future weakening in small banking support for small 
business.  This research shows how the initial perception of legislation impacts capital 
market decisions and may create a long-term resource constraint downstream for 
dependent small companies, thus suggesting a potential future framework for the 
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1 
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
 Banking is at the heart of our economy with key roles in recession and in 
recovery.  The prudent use of public depositors’ funds is overseen by a variety of 
regulators both state and federal.  This regulation, while well intentioned, may have 
unintended consequences with profound effects for the economy generally.  
 These papers examine one such regulation: the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.  Sarbanes-Oxley, passed in the wake of numerous failures of corporate governance, 
was intended to safeguard funds invested in public companies on principal stock 
exchanges as overseen by the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission.  While sweeping in 
its coverage, it is unclear whether SOX has been effective on behalf of public 
shareholders (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, & LaFond, 2008; Chhaochharia & 
Grinstein, 2007; Hostak, Karaoglu, Lys, & Yang, 2009; Leuz, Nasharr, Swanson, & 
Chatz, 2007), and its compliance burden has been acknowledged (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2006).   
Monitoring of all kinds has an associated cost.  In this case, however, we ask 
whether the cost of new regulation is borne equally by all banks, and, if not, are there any 
consequences of the differential cost burden?  We find that, in contrast with Barr, Killgo, 
Siems and Zimmel (2002), SOX has not had a disproportionate impact on small banks. 
 While not directly a banking regulation, SOX has had a significant impact on 
small banks and small business.  Small banks play a pivotal role in providing capital for 
small and start-up businesses (Sharpe, 1997).  Small businesses, in turn, provide 60-80% 
of net new jobs created in the United States, including 40% of critical high technology 
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positions (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and International Trade 
Statistics).  This process of job creation is central to the soundness of the U.S. economy. 
 In my first essay, I examine the impacts of SOX directly upon banks.  Using 
Transaction Cost Theory (Barr et al., 2002; Williamson, 1983, 1991a), I hypothesize that 
the direct cost impact will be significantly greater for small banks versus larger 
institutions.  I further hypothesize that this cost impact will be manifested in a reduction 
of small listed banks’ pretax income.  Finally, I hypothesize that the passage of SOX 
resulted in a reduction in the number of small banks electing public market participation. 
 I used a sample of 117 banks from the Federal Financial Institutions Examining 
Council (FFIEC) database.  I selected 60 large and 57 small banks randomly from the 
database, excluding certain types of banks that do no company lending, banks that have 
elected Subchapter S tax treatment, any bank that was acquired before the end of the 
observation period, and statistical outliers.  The data was drawn for two time periods: 
1998-2000, the period immediately preceding SOX, and 2004-2006, the time period after 
SOX.  The three years of data are averaged for each observation period to dampen the 
impact of a single year’s results. 
 Using hierarchical regression, I found support for the hypothesis that the direct 
cost impact of SOX would be significantly greater for small listed banks, but not for the 
hypothesis asserting that the impact would also be significant on pretax income.  The 
failure to support the pretax income hypotheses may reflect the general data “noise” in 
income, or the induced profitability enjoyed in the second observation period as a result 
of the different interest rate environment (Berger & Humphrey, 1991).  Alternatively, as 
this was a study of survivors, that is companies that operated throughout the SOX 
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implementation period, the lack of differentiation may represent successful coping 
strategies.  Using a population study, I examined the final hypothesis and found support 
for the expected reduction in small listed banks post SOX. 
 In my second essay, I consider, in the context of both small banks and small 
business, the likely follow-on impacts that would result from SOX.  With Resource 
Dependence Theory as a framework, I first hypothesize capital will be reduced generally 
for small financial institutions.  This is of particular importance as banks are only allowed 
growth in assets and hence in loans in strict ratio to their underlying equity.  Therefore, I 
further hypothesize that this reduction in capital will be accompanied by a reduction in 
the amount of small business lending done by small banks.   
 I use the same sample as in Essay 1.  Using hierarchical regression I find no 
significant support for the first hypothesis that post SOX small listed banks will have less 
capital.  I also find no empirical support for the second hypothesis predicting reduced 
business lending by small banks.  Moreover, there is a statistically significant growth in 
lending among small banks, in direct contrast with the hypothesis. 
 Based on my results, Transaction Cost Theory appears to explain the impact of 
compliance costs in the public market for equity for small banks in so far as choice of 
markets for capital is concerned.  In Essay 2 however, the value of Resource Dependence 
Theory as a theoretical prism for assessing the down-stream effects of a reduction in 
listed community banks’ lending capacity for small businesses is in doubt, as capital is 
not reduced and loans by small banks grew significantly.   
 Of interest then is whether, in Essay 1, the expectation rather than actual impact 
on earnings, capital and in turn loans influenced the decision on the part of a clearly 
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significant number of banks to remain private.  Further, it will be of interest to understand 
the coping strategies employed by the listed banks to balance the additional costs of SOX 
and whether these strategies have a long-term impact. 
I view this effort as “research opening” in that it raises other questions about the 
impact of other federal regulation, such as Dodd-Frank, on smaller businesses.  Thus, this 
dissertation may provide a potential framework for the future evaluation of the impact of 
compliance costs of proposed federal regulation.
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 Has the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) affected all banks in the same manner? 
And what actions have they taken in response? SOX-related regulation, created in the 
aftermath of financial scandals of the 1990s and early 2000s, was intended: “To protect 
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made 
pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes” ("Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,").  
While the net benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) are still being debated (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2008; Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007; Hostak et al., 2009; Leuz et al., 
2007), it is clear that there is a disclosure and reporting driven financial cost that must be 
borne by companies that elect to access the public market.   
 These costs are important in a regulated industry such as banking that derives its 
productive capacity for lending from its capital base.  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission stated that they believed the costs of SOX would increase commensurate 
with the size of the company (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003).  Despite 
the SEC’s contention, I suggest that the fixed element of SOX compliance costs has an 
impact that varies dramatically according to firm size. The general compliance activities 
required of all reporting companies represent a direct cost in additional analysis and 
reporting, as well as outside auditing.  These costs approach .5% of net profit for a bank 
with $10 billion in assets (the lower bound for the largest banks), but increase to 5% of 
profit for a bank with $1 billion in assets (the upper bound for a typical small/community 




bank) and 10% of profit for a midrange small bank (Barr et al., 2002).  This reduction of 
earnings, manageable for large banks, creates a dilemma for small banks.  They must 
consider whether the costs of compliance, essential to listing on a public market, are 
balanced by the value that public market access represents.  In short, they must choose 
among markets for capital.  The public market offers a low cost of funds at a significant 
cost of compliance, while the private market for funds is both more expensive and offers 
less capacity. 
 Listed banks of any size, faced with the prospect of increased costs resulting from 
requirements associated with their public listing, have three strategic responses available 
to them.  First, they can accept the increased costs, take no countervailing action and 
accept the resultant decrease in profitability as the cost is ultimately reflected in the 
financial statements of the institution.  Second, they can reduce costs elsewhere to avoid a 
reduction of income.  Third, they can elect to leave the public markets and raise capital in 
other venues.       
 In this essay, I examine the impact of SOX on small banks using Transaction Cost 
Theory (TCT).  TCT provides a framework in which to examine market choices in light 
of both the direct and indirect costs of a transaction (Williamson, 1983).  The theory 
states that a transaction will be undertaken in such a way as to minimize the cost of 
carrying it out (Williamson, 1991b).  While the attractiveness of the public market is 
clear on a direct cost basis, TCT, by considering the associated indirect costs of 
compliance, affords a more complete consideration of the true transaction costs.  
 For this reason, TCT is useful in examining the impact of SOX on small financial 
institutions’ costs, earnings, and capital market selection.  More specifically, I 




hypothesize that the impact of SOX on small banks was: (H1) to increase costs; (H2) to 
provide no offsetting benefit, resulting in a reduction in earnings; and (H3) as a 
consequence, to have a negative impact on capital market selection (i.e., fewer small 
banks accessing the public market).  Summing up, I hypothesize that small banks after 
SOX had significantly higher costs, significantly lower earnings, and reduced access to 
public capital markets. 
 This paper uses a pre-test, post-test design with a comparison group. The 
treatment group consists of an initial sample of 57 smaller financial institutions.  The 
comparison group consists of an initial sample of 60 of the nation’s largest banks.  The 
data was collected from the Financial Institutions Examination Council Central Data 
Repository and the Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR database.  Data was 
collected on 57 randomly selected small banks and 60 randomly selected large banks for 
the time periods of 1998-2000 and 2004-2006.  Both are three-year study periods with 
one occurring prior to SOX’s passage and the other occurring after SOX became law. 
Literature Review  
Transaction Cost Theory. 
Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) provides that a transaction will be undertaken in 
such a way as to minimize the cost of carrying it out (Williamson, 1991b).  Transactions 
can either take place in a market or in a hierarchical setting (essentially a firm exhibiting 
some level of vertical or horizontal integration).  According to TCT the choice of which 
venue to choose is determined by a consideration of the total costs of the transaction 
(direct and indirect).  TCT assumes that the decisions are taken in a behavioral context of 
bounded rationality, opportunism, and risk neutrality (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).  The 




driving structural elements of the transaction are: uncertainty, asset specificity, and 
transaction frequency.  
There are two types of uncertainty.  The first type, behavioral uncertainty, is 
defined as a risk that parties to a contract will not perform as agreed.  It results from the 
potential for opportunistic behavior by parties to the transaction (Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 
1998).  “Self-interest seeking with guile” is the description used by Williamson (1993). 
Behavioral uncertainty stems from the difficulty of monitoring behavior by the agent 
(opportunism), differences in risk sharing perspectives between parties to the transaction 
(how do I know you’ll deliver/how do I know you’ll pay) (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998), 
or from the exploitation of a contract weakness.  In all cases behavioral uncertainty 
reduces the efficiency of the transaction.   
The second type, environmental uncertainty, is defined as the inability of the firm 
to successfully forecast changes in the environment.  These might include changes in 
governmental policy, the macroeconomic effect of inflation, exchange and interest rates, 
changes in the quality and availability of materials, shifts in market preference and 
product demand, and changes in the competitive structure of the market (L. E. Brouthers, 
Brouthers, & Werner, 2000).  Environmental uncertainty is exogenous to the firm (Folta, 
1998) and concerns factors such as customer actions, raw material supplies, capital 
sources, and changes in technology.  
Both types of uncertainty have an impact upon the final decision in an 
organizational strategy context.  A useful example can be drawn from entry mode studies 
that contrast the entry mode choices of service firms with those of manufacturers.  Both 
types of firms are affected differently by the types of uncertainty, but satisfaction with 




performance is increased when firms examine both types of uncertainty and integrate 
appropriate responses to them into their governance structures (Keith D. Brouthers & 
Brouthers, 2000). 
Asset specificity is defined as assets, unique to the needs of the firm, “that cannot 
be costlessly redeployed to other uses” (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993:3).  Firms pursue 
vertical integration when asset specificity is high because the benefits of control outweigh 
the costs.  Conversely, when asset specificity is low, firms purchase in the market as the 
cost of control cannot be recouped by internal production (Erramilli & Rao, 1993).  
Asset specificity recognizes the degree of uniqueness of the assets central to the 
transaction.  Williamson (1983) identifies four kinds of specificity:  site assets, the 
dedication of assets to a location; physical assets, special dies and forms; human assets, 
specialists with, for example, specialized training; and dedicated assets, as in capacity 
designed solely to support a particular customer.  While generally considered in the 
context of hard assets, intangibles can also be considered to be transaction specific assets.  
For example, the development of a focused and dedicated sales force driving forward 
market channel internalization represents an investment in a specialized asset specific to 
the products and markets of the firm (Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007).  Consistent 
with the notion of asset specificity, the redeployment of this sales force would require 
further investment in retraining and at a significant additional cost.   
The particular type of asset specificity employed and/or encountered by a given 
firm may shift according to industry structure.  For instance, service industries may be 
more sensitive to human asset specificity, while manufacturing companies are more 
driven by consideration of physical assets (Keith D. Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003). 




Transaction frequency is defined as the number of times a transaction recurs. It is 
the least studied of the three structural elements.  Transaction frequency creates a 
potential for cost savings by internalizing the production of frequently purchased assets if 
the product is produced internally at a cost lower than that available in the market 
(Safizadeh, Field, & Ritzman, 2008).  Frequency could include the number of trades with 
an established partner (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002) or how often an item is traded 
in the marketplace (Williamson, 1991a).  In either case, the volume of activity helps to 
determine whether the firm should either make the product or buy it.  This decision often 
reflects the consideration of a number of issues such as the security of multiple external 
manufacturers, the cost of adding manufacturing capacity and the potential for 
product/model obsolescence (L. E. Brouthers et al., 2000). 
Thus, TCT is a model of firm behavior that addresses behavioral and 
environmental uncertainty, frequency of transaction, and specificity of assets.  Moreover, 
TCT provides that the purchasing party in a transaction considers indirect costs, like 
compliance costs, in determining the appropriate transaction structure.  Consequently, the 
impact of such ancillary considerations as costs and fees, resulting from the effect of 
regulation, can be reflected in the likely outcome.  In contrast with the Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) model, which held taxes as irrelevant and capital instruments as largely 
interchangeable, TCT provides a framework in which to judge the operational impact of 
the complete range of costs including regulatory assessment, increased audit costs, and 
the costs of governance occasioned by Board of Directors activities.  TCT holds that 
substantial costs, whether they are direct (such as interest costs) or indirect (such as the 




cost of regulatory compliance), may influence whether banks choose public or private 
markets.   
TCT considers both direct and indirect costs.  To examine the likely impact of 
SOX, I first establish the direct cost impact of compliance for small banks.  TCT allows 
for consideration of the complete range of costs with a view toward judging whether the 
costs, taken in total, are significant such that they affect decisions about the acquisition of 
goods or services.  In assessing the cost impact of SOX, I consider the range of direct 
costs that a small bank would be forced to incur to achieve compliance.  These include, 
but are not limited to: costs incurred in the annual audit, costs incurred for a second audit 
firm to perform the control review, additional board of director costs for SOX activities, 
and systems costs (both hardware and software related) to provide for general control 
tracking or to strengthen the information technology systems to meet control 
requirements (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006).  TCT holds that the total 
final cost is the determining factor in the market selection decision.   
Of significance is the timing and extent of SOX compliance for the sample banks 
chosen here.  SOX required filing compliance based upon the market value of the entity’s 
securities on a public exchange.  Accelerated filers, with at least $75 million of public 
market securities, were required to file commencing with the first fiscal year ending after 
November 15, 2004.  The banks chosen for the small bank sample had assets in 2000 of 
$300 to $500 million requiring $30 to $50 million of nominal capital (approximately 10% 
of assets).  Banks traded throughout the period at a market value of 1.5 times book or 
greater (Argus Research, 2008). With growth from 2000 to 2004, each of the institutions 




likely either qualified as an accelerated filer or was rapidly approaching that status.  
Therefore we expect the costs of compliance to be observable among the small banks.   
It is possible that SOX, in addition to requiring the incurrence of the direct costs 
enumerated above, could also provide reduced indirect costs or additional operational 
benefits that offset the direct costs such that the total costs are the same as before or 
lower.  Benefits could be reflected in lower costs of sales, marketing, or transportation.  
SOX could also serve to lower other state, federal, or local compliance costs.  If these 
benefits were present, from whatever source and however diffuse, then their impact could 
be considered in combination with their costs.  If there is no reduction of net income, then 
we conclude that absent some identifiable benefit, the shortfall created by direct costs is 
balanced by some combination of cost saving initiatives or deferrals.  Small banks, for 
example, are sensitive to the relatively high fixed costs of key marketing initiatives such 
as geographic expansion and key personnel acquisition.  Thus small banks may have 
elected to defer building the next branch or adding expensive lending staff.  If however, 
notwithstanding any savings resulting from operational benefits, there is a negative 
impact to net income then, consistent with TCT, a resulting shift in market preference 
from the public to the private market for capital is expected.   
Each of these choices could impact the growth rate of the banks and hence the 
capacity of the bank to provide loans to small business (examined in Essay #2).  
Regulatory Environment. 
 It is useful to review the compliance environment for financial institutions at the 
time of the passage of SOX. Banking is a highly regulated industry with both state and 
federal regulatory bodies providing oversight of both the bank, and where applicable, its 




holding company.  Nevertheless, combinations of economic downturn, legislative action 
and managerial excess can lead to significant losses from financial institutions and the 
industry. The savings and loan crisis of the mid 1980’s to mid 1990’s resulted in the 
failure of 747 of the 3,234 savings and loan institutions in the U.S. This led to the passage 
of two significant pieces of regulation.  The Financial Institutions Restitution and 
Recovery Act of 1989 (FIRREA) provided significant enforcement authority for 
regulators by granting the power to impose Cease and Desist Orders and to assess 
administrative civil money penalties from officers and directors.  This was followed in 
1991 by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FIDICIA).  This 
act provided for the assessment of and attestation to the sufficiency of financial controls 
by senior management, and in the case of large banks, their auditors.  Initially the 
reporting threshold for FIDICIA was established at $500 million and was raised to $1 
billion in 2006. Thus financial institutions already faced the potential for significant fines 
and a requirement to attest to the sufficiency of their controls.  SOX as passed in 2002, 
like FIDICIA, focused in large part upon the sufficiency of internal control systems and 
activities but added significant additional cost with the requirement for external testing, 
and the extension to nonbank subsidiaries and to the holding company.  In the period 
immediately after passage of SOX, the SEC began to adjust the required date of 
implementation for filers with large accelerated filing companies (greater than $700 
million of public common equity securities) filing immediately, and accelerated filers 
(equity of $75 million to $700 million of public common equity securities) required to 
file for the first fiscal year ending after November 2004.  The implementation date for 




non-accelerated filers was delayed a number of times, finally ending with their exemption 
from filing under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.   
Strategy Choices for Small Banks. 
 Most banks follow a similar initial path from inception to a size of about $300 
million.  Upon approval to proceed by the appropriate regulatory authority, a start-up 
bank will raise, from founders and the local community, the agreed amount of capital.  
With this capital, the new bank commences operations and, with local deposits providing 
loanable funds, begins to build a balance sheet and create an income stream.  Once 
profitability is achieved, additions to the capital accounts provide a basis for further 
lending.  Absent access to additional capital, the bank is constrained to that level of 
growth supported by the annual increase in capital from earnings.  For a bank earning 1% 
on assets (an approximation of average results) this translates into a maximum of 10% 
growth in assets a year.  This results from the regulatory requirement to maintain a capital 
ratio (capital to assets) of 10%.  
SOX and Smaller Bank Direct Costs. 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), passed on July 30, 2002 was intended “to help 
protect investors and restore investor confidence” (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2006).  The Act prescribes a program of public company accounting standards 
and corporate governance review, attention to corporate and criminal fraud accountability 
with enhanced associated penalties, and a heightened assessment and reporting of internal 
control structure and effectiveness [HR 3763].   It is the last area of internal control 
review, designated as Section 404, which accounts for a significant cost to public 
corporations.  Total costs include those costs established by the act to support new 




infrastructure and the direct costs borne by individual companies that must comply with 
the provisions of the act.  
 The cost of implementation of the public infrastructure called for in the act is 
significant.  The act directs the establishment of a new agency, The Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).  Studies document the costs of compliance with 
the act ($599,627,000 for the first 7 years of operating costs of the PCAOB alone, with 
one major fine of $1,000,000) (Gilbertson & Herron, 2009).  This cost is recovered 
through the assessment of fees on public corporations. 
The most immediate strategic impact on smaller financial institutions is the 
financial burden that SOX compliance creates.  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), in a 2009 empirical study of public reporting companies (n = 2842), 
provides a clear assessment of that impact.  More specifically, compliance with SOX 
requires additional auditing, reporting, and Board of Directors activity, with associated 
costs that are non-linear with respect to firm size (U.S. Securites and Exchange 
Commission, 2009).  Krishnan et al. (2008) in a broad study of SOX related expenses in 
non-financial firms identify three types of costs: additional audit fees, internal labor costs 
and consulting/technology expenses.  This later category would include outsourced 
assistance by an additional accounting firm to perform the initial assessment of the 
internal control environment, which would in turn lead to additional auditing fees in the 
review of the work.  Once established, the internal controls must be reviewed annually 
and maintained.  Krishnan et al. (2008) further identified the highly significant costs that 
arise if the internal control review drives restatement of the financial statements.  
Financial institutions, as regulated entities, undergo frequent auditing from multiple 




parties, have extensive internal control experience, and have very few restatements for 
the critical period 2004-2006.  Banks have 18 total restatements for the three years versus 
3,316 for all public reporting companies.  Thus, we conclude that financial institutions 
are principally exposed to the governance-related costs of SOX (Audit Analytics, 2007) 
as opposed to the costs of control deficiency remediation.  These governance-related 
costs, a requirement of public market access, can be up to 40 times greater (taken as a 
percent of revenue) for smaller banks than for the largest banks (U.S. Securites and 
Exchange Commission, 2009), and are highly meaningful for smaller financial 
institutions, potentially rendering the public market too expensive.  Small banks, 
sometimes referred to as community banks, are generally $1 billion or less in total asset 
size, while the top 50 banks in the U.S. range from $25 billion to $2.3 trillion in assets 
(U.S. Federal Reserve, 2012).  Thus, a given fixed cost has a much greater impact on 
smaller banks than on larger ones.  Of significance for this study is the initial question of 
whether the costs, post-SOX are a significant differentiator between small public and 
large public banks. 
Hence, based on the above literature I hypothesize: 
H1: Post-SOX SEC reporting small banks’ costs are statistically significantly 
higher than those of large reporting banks, as compared to the pre-SOX costs for 
the same two samples of banks. 
SOX and Smaller Bank Indirect Costs or Benefits. 
Researchers propose that if there are direct costs of SOX, they can be offset by 
some resulting reduction in indirect costs due to SOX compliance.  Gramling et al. (2009) 
report that approximately 21% of small company filers reported some material weakness 




in internal controls.  Sinnett (2009:35), summarizing the findings of the Financial 
Executive Institute 2005 report Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Implementation: Practices of 
Leading Companies, states: “most of the participating executives agreed that compliance 
with section 404 had resulted in specific benefits to their businesses, such as encouraging 
a thorough review of existing processes in their business units”.  Schneider et al. (2009) 
detail the significant costs associated with the existence and correction of internal control 
deficiencies, including the reaction of the equity markets and financing sources with 
resulting higher credit spreads and higher cost of equity.  Correction of these deficiencies 
could have provided some reduction in indirect costs.  Akhigbe and Martin (2006) note 
that valuation effects were generally favorable for companies post SOX albeit less so for 
small firms. 
Other scholars suggest that SOX compliance creates a considerable drag in the 
form of indirect costs and the potential of significant strategic harm.  Research on SOX’s 
potential improvements in the quality of earnings, transparency of information, the 
consistency of accounting data, and effectiveness of governance have not produced 
measurable offsets to costs.  Wilson (2009) notes the general lack of improvement in the 
quality of reported earnings.  Siegel, Franz and O’Shaughnessy (2010) examining the 
impact on listed versus non-listed banks find that ∆ROA and ∆ROE were positive post 
SOX for unlisted firms and negative for listed firms.  Moreover, it appears unclear 
whether transparency will provide net benefits.  While the reduced costs of debt or equity 
provided by the public market have long-term value, the required disclosures and the 
market imposed penalties for disclosed internal control deficiencies are a significant 
offset. Liebeskind (1996) argues that knowledge is a strategic asset worthy of protection.  




The Act calls for full disclosure of internal control deficiencies with significant 
associated penalties for non-compliance.  Full disclosure, as called for in the Act, to the 
extent it can be provided, may compromise the ability of a firm to implement its 
strategies (Barney, 1991), compromising the effectiveness of its management team.  
Indeed, disclosure of internal control deficiencies brings an immediate and negative 
equity and debt market effect.  Schneider et al. (2009) cite research finding abnormal 
negative returns subsequent to the acknowledgement of an internal control deficiency.  
Similarly, analyst earnings forecasts were adjusted downward and risk assessed as higher.  
Indeed, Hermanson and Ye (2009) report a reduced likelihood of early reporting in 
advance of a securities offering so as to maximize the proceeds.  On balance, there was a 
reduction in accrual earnings management and an increase in real earnings management 
documented post-SOX by Cohen, Lys and Dey (2008), as managers sought to meet 
targets without managing the accrual accounting estimates.  Real earnings management, 
however, may involve deferral of investment and hiring and could have a negative long-
term implication for the firm.  
Similarly, the Act has impact on the allocation of resources within the firm.  
Ghose and Rajan (2006:16) conclude: 
 
“Given that most organizations have a finite annual budget that is allocated to all 
investments, the regulations accruing from the SOX Act have forced companies to 
undertake a series of dramatic changes in the way they appropriate resources to activities 
such as IT security and internal controls.  This can have some broader ramifications on 
firm profitability, market structure and social welfare many of which were unintended 
when policy makers first formulated this act.” 
 
The breadth of the requirements (particularly Sections 201 and 404) and their 
applicability across all organizations have been questioned.  For instance, Tong & Sapra 




(2009:1954) conclude, “Our analysis also implies that a mandatory restriction of non-
audit services imposed by Section 201 of SOX may decrease audit quality and damage 
investment efficiency”.  The likelihood of SOX acting as a positive agent of change in the 
auditing profession also has been called into question (Bazerman, Moore, Tetlock, & 
Tanlu, 2006). Collis, Young and Goold (2007:388) ascribe the compliance activities to 
the third role of a corporate headquarters, specifically mentioning SOX compliance, and 
observe, “This role as the representative of the firm to external constituencies is a pure 
overhead expense since it has no operational benefits”.  
The Act further establishes new requirements for each board of directors’ 
governance activities, including additional audit committee oversight.  Such new 
requirements serve to raise costs.  
Indirect cost reductions (if there are any) of whatever form ultimately impact the 
revenue stream or the cost structure and are for that reason reflected in the net income of 
the company.  In the absence of countervailing offsets the direct cost impact should result 
in lower overall income.  Hence, 
H2:  Post SOX earnings for listed small banks are more negatively impacted than 
those of large listed banks. 
SOX, Small Banks and the Public Market/Private Market Decision.   
Public financial institutions, large and small, access the capital markets through 
one of the principal financial exchanges (New York Stock Exchange [NYSE], American 
Stock Exchange [ASE] acquired by NYSE in 2008, the National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations Systems [NASDAQ] National Market and 
Capital Market exchanges, and the Over the Counter Bulletin Board [OTC-BB]).  These 




exchanges provide capacity and attractive costs.  Of particular note is the number of 
small financial institutions “going dark”, that is, delisting from these principal public 
stock exchanges in recent years (Engel et al., 2007).  In addition to delisting, companies 
may elect to forego public market membership.  Thus the number of member or listed 
firms of a particular industry segment reflects the net of losses to delisting as well as the 
decision of growing firms to forego listing.  The market for capital for an organization 
includes various forms of debt and equity, and the choice among markets and instruments 
reflects a pecking order determined by circumstances (Bagley, Ghosh, & Yaari, 1998).  
Sources of capital range from least expensive (public equity and debt markets) to most 
expensive (private equity investors or funds).  
SOX compliance, as a requirement for accessing the public market for capital, has 
a significant impact on cost and governance structure.  The cost of SOX compliance has 
been measured at 2.55% of revenues for small firms (market capitalization less than $100 
million, consistent with the capitalization of small financial institutions) as compared to 
.27% of revenues for medium sized public firms (market capitalization of $500 million to 
$999 million) and .06% of revenues for large firms (market capitalization greater than $5 
billion, the market capital of the largest banks) (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2006).  Thus we would expect the costs for financial institutions to be 
significant and, consistent with the SEC findings above, of greater effect on small banks.  
This disproportionate impact on small firms results in misalignment (Williamson, 1996) 
with the associated loss of efficiency, producing an adverse impact on capital market 
costs and hence capital source choices.  The strategic impact of misalignment is even 
more pronounced on smaller firms (Argyres & Bigelow, 2007).  




Levy (2009) notes that many private companies are reevaluating the decision to 
go public in light of the increased cost of compliance with SOX.  Likewise, the majority 
of the increase in going private transactions is among smaller companies for whom the 
cost of compliance represents a significant portion of profits.  In each case the practical 
result is to eliminate a significant and relatively inexpensive source of capital.  These 
costs can be generalized across industries and firms, since SOX is required for all 
publicly traded firms.   
The General Accounting Office, in its April 2006 report to the Committee on 
Small Business and Entrepreneurship of the U.S. Senate, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT - 
Consideration of Key Principles Needed in Addressing Implementation for Smaller 
Public Companies, identified both the reduction in small company initial public offerings 
(IPOs) as well as the trend among small companies toward going private (delisting) as 
SOX related.  Further, it must be noted that exclusion from the public market also means 
a loss of further capital cost reducing opportunities such as shelf registrations and the 
support of active market makers (Anand, Tanggaard, & Weaver, 2009). 
In TCT, differences and similarities among companies are identified via three 
principal attributes of a transaction: asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency.  With 
respect to specificity, for firms seeking equity capital, money is fungible and capital 
instruments are uniform.  For these two reasons, financial institutions generally exhibit 
low asset specificity (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993).  For that reason they tend to prefer 
market-based transactions.  This is evident through the active competition in the public 
market by banks large and small for borrowing in the contractual form of deposits, a form 
of debt unique to banking.  For public reporting banks, uncertainty is resolved through 




the application of extensive rules-driven public market auditing and associated securities 
exchange reporting.  This suggests that from an uncertainty perspective banks also tend to 
prefer market-based transactions.  Finally, with respect to the attribute of frequency, the 
need to raise capital is infrequent.  This too, leads to a preference for market-based 
outsourcing in the public capital markets (Safizadeh et al., 2008). 
Thus, financial institutions are both well adapted to and familiar with public 
markets and exhibit a strong preference for market transactions.  Why then would a bank 
undertake a private transaction to raise equity?  Private transactions may take many forms 
but are typically higher cost and have shorter maturity than that offered by the public 
market (Berger & Udell, 1998).  For those reasons they are usually undertaken only as a 
stop-gap measure to support continued growth (Berger & Udell, 1998) or, in the case of 
small banks in the immediate period after commencing operations, private transactions 
may serve to “bridge” the bank to a size sufficient to enter the public market for equity 
capital (Berger & Udell, 1998). 
Thus, for capital markets, the public market offers the greatest number of 
suppliers of capital and the likely lowest cost.  However, registration for participation in 
the public market brings costs in the form of additional auditing and compliance.  These 
costs are required to access to the public equity market, characterized by the principal 
stock exchanges.  Nevertheless, adjusted for all offering costs (but not compliance costs), 
these exchanges represent the least expensive sources for equity capital (Easley & 
O'Hara, 2004).  However, additional compliance costs, such as in the case of SOX, 
significantly affect these costs, resulting in a preference for private capital over public 
capital, particularly for small banks. 




The passage of SOX introduced an additional set of compliance costs, which fall 
disproportionally on small companies generally.  These costs include: additional work by 
an additional outside auditor to develop the set of controls that must be maintained, 
additional disclosures in each transaction, staff time to conduct additional tests of the 
control environment, and additional time by management and the board of directors in 
evaluating the results and providing reports.  These actions are the required minimum and 
must be conducted for all reporting entities.  This establishes a minimum level of cost 
that does not increase directly with size.  These additional SOX-related compliance costs 
significantly affected the costs associated with entering public capital markets.  I 
hypothesize that from a TCT perspective, these significant additional costs (often 
amounting to 10% of profits) shift the preference of small banks from markets to 
hierarchies and hence to a preference for private capital over public capital. 
H3:  The post SOX percentage of small banks choosing public market equity is 
lower than the pre SOX percentage.  
Methods 
                                                                                                                           
Design. 
 This paper uses a quasi-experimental pre-test, post-test design (Shadish, Cook, & 
Campbell, 2002).  This paper examines data from two periods: period 1 includes pre-
SOX data from 1998 -2000 and period 2 includes post-SOX data from 2004 – 2006.  
SOX was enacted in 2002.  Implementation of the act was undertaken in phases and the 
2004-2006 period was chosen to ensure that the treatment effect was in place but to avoid 
the economic downturn of 2008 and beyond. 




 A quasi-experimental design differs from experimental design in that the 
treatment group cannot be manipulated by the observer (Shadish et al., 2002:159).  In this 
paper the treatment is the passage of SOX.  The treatment group in each hypothesis is 
expected to be affected by the passage of SOX, with the potential for differing effects 
between subgroups.  
Data Sources. 
 The data for Hypothesis H1 and H2 is drawn from the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Central Data Repository.  The FFIEC is a 
formal interagency body of the U.S. Government charged with the coordination of 
regulation for financial institutions.  In that role the FFIEC maintains the Central Data 
Repository.  All chartered financial institutions operating in the United States are 
required to submit quarterly information through the U. S. Federal Reserve and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to the Central Data Repository using a designated 
format.  This format provides for consistency of accounting definition and measurement 
across reporting companies and across time and hence avoids the problem of source 
induced data variation (Berger & Mester, 1997).  These reports are extensive, capturing 
balance sheet and income statement information in significant detail.  Additionally, there 
are memorandum fields that provide for comments and explanations.  This database has 
been used extensively for efficiency analysis of U.S. banks (Barr et al., 2002; Siems & 
Barr, 1998). 
 Data for the analysis of H3 is drawn from the Compustat database and from the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Statistics on Depository Institutions Database.  




Information regarding the listing status was drawn from Compustat, while the data on 
number of banks by asset size was drawn from the FDIC. 
Samples and Sample Size 
 The treatment group for H1 and H2 consists of a random sample of 57 small SEC 
reporting (listed) financial institutions and 60 large listed financial institutions that were 
in existence throughout the pre-SOX and post-SOX period.  For the purposes of the 
study, small banks are defined as having greater than $300 million but less than $500 
million in total assets and must have been in business longer than three years.  Public 
banks of this size are likely at or approaching the threshold for reporting under SOX as 
accelerated filers (defined as market capital of $75 million or greater).  Large banks have 
been providing internal control reports for some period under the compliance provisions 
of FDICIA and will face some incremental expense to comply with SOX.  Small banks 
however have been exempt from FDICIA and are facing full financial control reporting 
for the first time.  In addition, Garneau and Shahid (1991) report on perceived “regulatory 
creep” and note the FDIC’s recommendation for small banks to include CEO/CFO 
certification.  Consequently, banks of this size are likely mindful of the potential costs.  
 Large banks are defined as banks having more than $2 billion in assets.  Both the 
large and small banks used in the analysis are chartered financial institutions with 
principal operations in the United States. 
 A number of companies carry banking charters but use them in limited ways.  The 
focus of this study is on those banks that actually perform the core banking activities of 
taking deposits and making loans.  Excluded from the study therefore are organizations 
performing limited or specialized banking.  These include:  trust and investment 




organizations that may hold deposits in connection with their custodian activities, credit 
card banks conducting card related operations only, and foreign bank U.S. subsidiaries 
providing heavy equipment leasing.  These banks are involved in financial activities that 
have no relevance to our study.   
Also, banks three years old or less have been excluded.  This allows for the 
avoidance of those banks that are recently formed and may be operating under more 
restrictive provisions as a start-up financial institution (DeYoung, 2003).  These 
restrictive provisions are imposed as a feature of the banking charter granted by the state 
or federal government and may include, for example, the requirement to maintain 
additional capital during the first three years (DeYoung, 2003).  The intent is to limit 
what a new bank and operating team can do as a way of minimizing risk during the start-
up period.  These limitations typically match the amount of capital available at start-up 
with operational needs eliminating the requirement to seek additional capital from other 
sources.   
 Additionally, those banks that have elected Subchapter S treatment for federal 
taxation are excluded from the samples.  Subchapter S limits a bank to 100 shareholders 
and consequently precludes effective use of the public capital markets.  Finally, since the 
analysis focuses on survivors, those institutions that are acquired in a merger transaction 
during the study period have been excluded.   
 Thus the following banks have been excluded: 
1. Credit Card Banks 
2. Trust Banks 
3. Foreign subsidiaries engaged in leasing 




4. New banks (3 years old or less) 
5. Federal Tax structure Subchapter S banks 
6. Banks acquired in the course of the study. 
 For H3 we will analyze the shift in capital market preferences of the population of 
financial institutions of all sizes both pre and post-SOX.  As we are not attempting to 
compare accounting data over time but rather general preferences for capital markets, we 
will use the population of banks for 1998, 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2011.  We include both 
banks and savings and loans.  In this way we provide a framework reflective of public 
market trends and preferences both before and after the enactment of SOX. 
 Following Hair et al. (2010, pp. 5,171) and Cohen (1992, p. 158) the study for H1 
and H2 was designed with an initial random sample of n=120. Upon examining the data I 
removed one bank that did not report any data for Business Loans and two banks that 
were outliers.  The resulting sample was n=117. 
Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables (with the exception of the information on public filing 
status) are drawn from the FFIEC database described above.  The dependent variables 
used here are from national databases consistently used for analysis of banking 
companies (Calomiris & Karceski, 2000; Madura & Wiant, 1994; Steven J. Pilloff, 1996; 
Steven J.  Pilloff & Rhoades, 2002; Rhoades, 1998; Srinivasan & Wall, 1992).  The 
FFIEC database line reference code is provided in parentheses after the data element 
name.   
 For Hypothesis 1 the dependent variable is OTHER EXPENSE (RIAD4092).  
Financial institutions report their income, expenses and balance sheet information in a 




format provided by the Federal Financial Institutions Examining Council in their role as 
agent for the FDIC, The Federal Reserve and The Office of the Controller of the 
Currency.  This insures a consistent chart of accounts for calculation of regulatory ratios 
The Other Expense category is a subcategory of Total Noninterest Expense (RIAD 4093. 
There are two other subcategories of Total Noninterest Expense:  Salary and Employee 
Benefits (RIAD 4135) and Expenses of Premises and Fixed Assets (RIAD 4217).  These 
two subcategories together with Other Expense make up the category Total noninterest 
Expense.  This general category (Total Noninterest Expense) functions as the General 
and Administrative category for financial institutions.  Krishnan et al. (2008:171) 
identified these categories as the likely location for SOX related expenses.  These are 
direct costs exclusive of the interest costs associated with funding the lending operation.  
The Federal Reserve Micro Data Reference Manual provides that subcategory Other 
Expense (RIAD 4092) shall include: “ Fees paid to directors for attendance at Board of 
Directors or committee meetings (including travel and expense allowances)”, “Premiums 
on fidelity insurance (blanket bond, excess employee dishonestly bond), directors and 
officers liability insurance, and life insurance policies for which the bank is the 
beneficiary”, “Research and development costs and costs incurred in the internal 
development of software”, and “Retainer fees, legal fees, audit fees, and other fees paid 
to attorneys, accountants, management consultants, investment counselors, and other 
professionals who are not bank officers or employees”.  Thus, the Other Expense 
subcategory is used to capture board of directors’ expense, auditor, legal and consulting 
expense and is consequently the best measure of SOX direct cost impact.  This variable 
has been used in prior studies of bank costs (Srinivasan & Wall, 1992) and was used by 




Altamura and Beatty to measure the impact of FDICIA reporting, a similar internal 
reporting control regime.  The ratio of post-SOX three-year OTHER EXPENSE divided 
by pre-SOX three-year OTHER EXPENSE is used.  By using the post/pre ratio relative 
size is controlled for and all data normalized to a start point value of 1. For Hypothesis 2 
the dependent variable is PRETAX EARNINGS (RIAD4301).  These earnings reflect the 
impact of all operations except for the effect of taxes.  By measuring all revenue and cost 
before taxes, consistency among institutions that may be pursuing varying levels of 
investments in non-taxable municipal bonds is preserved.  This measure has been used in 
prior studies of bank costs (Hwang, Lee, & Liaw, 1997).  The ratio of post-SOX three-
year PRETAX EARNINGS divided by pre-SOX three-year PRETAX EARNINGS was 
used.  By using the post/pre ratio relative size effect is controlled for and all data 
normalized all data to a start point value of 1. 
Independent Variable. 
 The following variable is used:  
 BANK SIZE will be coded 0 for large banks and 1 for small banks; Bank size has 
been used in prior studies (Berger, Frame, & Miller, 2005; Cyree, Hein, & Koch, 2005) 
Control Variables. 
 The potential impact of key structural differences will be controlled for through 
the use of the following control variables: BANK CHARTER is the type of charter, state 
or national, the bank holds under which it does business (Cyree, Wansley, & Boehm, 
2000), and will be coded 0 for state and 1 for national; MULTIBANK HOLDING 
COMPANY captures the format of the bank structure whether single bank or multi-bank 




holding company (Thomson, 1991) and is coded 0 if single or 1 for multi-bank holding 
company. 
Analysis. 
Hierarchical regression (Edmondson & McManus, 2007) is used for H1 and H2. 
The analysis was conducted in two steps.  First the control variables were entered.  Next 
the main effect variable was added.  In H1, an increase in the amount of other expense for 
the small listed banks was anticipated.  Thus, if beyond the effect of the control variables 
the main effect variable of bank size is significant in the expected direction, we can 
conclude that H1 is supported.  H2 anticipates a reduction of pretax earnings by small 
public banks relative to small banks generally.  Consequently, if beyond the impact of the 
control variables, the main effect of bank size is significant in the expected direction, we 
can conclude that H2 is supported.  
 The distribution was analyzed and is both peaked and exhibits a positive skew.  
This is attributable to the large banks being frequent acquirers and over time adding 
significantly to their asset size and hence earnings.  The data therefore was transformed 
by taking its natural logarithm (Hair et al., 2010).  
For H3 we analyze the population trends for small banks, assessing the percentage 
in each of the reporting years of small public banks as a percentage of total banks and as 
a percentage of public banks.  We compare this data with the trends among similar 
segments of larger banks to determine whether there is a discernable change in the 
difference between large and small banks in their preference for public market listing.  




Threats to Inference. 
 The analysis follows Shadish et al. (2002:55) in an evaluation of threats to 
inference.  The following threats are of concern due to the structure of the experiment and 
the time periods under study and apply to each of the hypotheses.  Of particular initial 
concern is history, as there were other “treatment-like” events occurring during the time 
period under examination.  More specifically, the Small Business Job Protection Act of 
1996 extended to banks the ability to elect Subchapter S status for assessment of federal 
taxes effective in 1997.  A significant number of banks converted to S Corporation status 
(FDIC database).  These banks when compared to C Corporation (remaining under the 
normal corporate tax provision) banks are smaller, slower growing, more rural 
institutions with less commercial and industrial lending (Cyree et al., 2005).  To control 
for this possible confounding effect, S Corporation banks are excluded from the study.   
Maturation was considered as a potential threat due to the four-year break 
between measurement periods.  Maturation is the process of change that an organization 
undergoes with the passage of time.  This is the case of “growing older, hungrier, wiser, 
stronger, or more experienced” (Shadish et al., 2002).  In the typical corporation this may 
include changes in business model, level of vertical integration and product line.  In 
banking, however, the business model is highly regulated and relatively unchanging, 
except for balance sheet growth.  The growth rate for financial institutions from 
12/31/2000 to 12/31/2004 averaged 7.74% annually (FDIC Data Base).  This makes it 
unlikely that a small bank could grow to the size of a large bank, mitigating that threat.  
As Berger et al. (1995) suggest, the highly regulated nature of the industry and the 




consistency of business model among banks, as evidenced by relatively high permitted 
leverage ratios, further serve to mitigate threats to inference. 
Findings 
The minima, maxima, means, and standard deviations of the variables are 
reported in Table 1.  The means of the data show that for Other Expense (show as a 
percent of assets) both large and small banks reflect a decline in the values post SOX 
with large banks showing the greatest decline.  This decline is reflective of the 
operational leverage gained by the institutions as a result of their growth over the period 
of study. For Pre-tax Income, the means show a modest reduction of income for small 
banks while large banks grew income.  There is however considerable Pre-tax Income 
variance among large banks as reflected in the standard deviation.  The correlations are 
reported in Table 2. Bank size is correlated with Other Expense at the p<.05 level with 
the expected sign. Pre-tax Income is correlated with Banks Size at the p<.1 with the 
expected sign.  The results of the hierarchical linear regression on Other Expense and 
Pretax Income are reported in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.  Table 5 provides the results of 
the analysis of the data on public company status. I used a Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) of 10 as a threshold value for multicollinearity, (Hair et al., 2010), and no measure 
exceeded this threshold (the highest was 1.18).  
 












Other Expense Cost. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that post-SOX other expense is higher than pre-SOX for 
listed small banks than for large banks.  This hypothesis was tested using hierarchical 
linear regression in a two-step model (Models 1A & 1B) as shown in Table 3.  Model 1A 
included the control variables that reflect holding company structure and whether the 
bank has a state or federal banking charter. The R2 values were not significant for this 
model.   
Model 1B included the main effect variable Bank Size and was significant. The F 
value and the F change value were significant at the p < .10 level and the p < .05 level 
respectively for this model. 
Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported, as the listed small banks other expense 











    
Pretax Income. 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that post SOX pretax Income will be reduced for small 
listed banks as compared to large listed banks.  The analytical approach is the same as 
Hypothesis 1 and is shown in Table 3.  Model 2A, including the control variables, was 
not significant.	  




 Model 2B included the main effect variable, Bank Size and was not significant at 










Small Bank Public Market Selection. 
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that small banks are more likely to be private post-SOX 
than pre-SOX.  We assess this outcome through analysis of the various time periods. 
Recall that the number of public banks, either small or large, reflects several phenomena.  
Banks may grow in assets over time, possibly moving from one category to another.  
Alternatively, banks may elect to cease public market membership through the “going 
dark” process or as a result of merger with another institution (where the electing bank is 
not the survivor).  Finally, the level of public banks may be increased by banks electing 
public market membership.  As we want to capture the preferences of all banks large and 
small, we define small banks as having less than $500 million in assets and large as 
having over $500 million in assets.  We use 1998 and 2000 to establish the trend in 
preference for public listing pre-SOX and 2004, 2006 and 20011 to illustrate the trend 
post-SOX. Table 4 provides an overview of the numbers of banks by category for each of 
the relevant time periods. 
 Table 5 shows the change in the number of U.S. Banks over the period 1998 to 
2011, a decline of 29.7%.  During that period, public banks as a percentage of total banks 
increase from 8.1% to 8.8% with a high in 2004 of 9.3%.  Within the category of Public 
Banks, large banks, by number, increase from 54.7% to 78.5%, reflecting a small bank 
decline from 45.3% to 21.5%.  Large public banks taken as a percentage of large banks 
show a decline in percentage terms of 6.8% from 2000 to 2004 and 17.8% from 2000 to 
2006.  Small banks during the same periods show declines of 20.9% and 39.5% 
respectively.  In summary, the data show that the preference of small banks for public 
market membership, stable to increasing in the years 1998 and 2000 pre-SOX, declines 




significantly, by number, in the post-SOX years – and the percentage decline is much 




 This study examines whether, first, the imposition of SOX resulted in higher costs 
for small public market listed banks, second whether that expense would be reflected in 
the pretax earnings of the banks, and finally whether small banks post-SOX chose to 
enter public markets less frequently than prior to SOX.   
 We theorized that as the costs of SOX compliance fell disproportionately on small 
banks.  This added cost, consistent with Transaction Cost Theory, would be sufficient to 
reduce the number of banks going public.  We hypothesized (H1) that Other Expenses 
would be greater in the post-SOX period for small banks than large banks.  Hypothesis 1 
was supported.  




 We further hypothesized (H2) that this relative increase in costs for small banks 
would be carried through to the income statement and reflected in the pretax Income of 
the bank.  Our Hypothesis 2 was not supported.  Why were the relative cost increases for 
small banks not detected in the pretax income figure?  Part of this is likely attributable to 
the variability of earnings generally, as small bank earnings can be significantly impacted 
by the costs of a new branch, additions to staff, loan charge-offs and recoveries.  It may 
also reflect the different interest rate environments of the two periods.  In the first 
observation period (1998-2000), interest rates were relatively stable with the prime rate 
increasing from a nominal rate of 7.75% to 9.25%, an increase of 22.5%.  In the second 
observation period (2004-2006) the prime rate increased sharply from a nominal rate of 
4.00% to 8.25%, an increase of 106%.  Banks exhibit “stickiness” on re-pricing their 
deposits during periods of rising rates (Berger, 1991) while they are able to quickly 
institute increased interest charges on loans, and this affords an opportunity for increased 
earnings.  Thus, the increase in earnings may have obscured the impact of SOX.  Part of 
the answer may be in the results obtained in the analysis of Hypothesis 3. 
 In Hypothesis 3, we hypothesized that, post SOX, small banks would be more 
likely to choose private status and/or delist from the major exchanges. An analysis of the 
trends in public market preference pre-SOX versus post-SOX supports Hypothesis 3.  
Small banks increasingly support private status over public status post-SOX.  Therefore, 
the results in H1 and H2 may represent significant coping strategies adapted by the small 
public banks. 





 The role of the small bank in the provision of credit to small business is well 
documented (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006).  Likewise, the central role played by small 
banks in providing funding to small/new businesses is clearly understood (Berger & 
Udell, 2002; Sharpe, 1997).  Small banks raise capital and then deposits to grow with the 
companies and communities they serve.  The imposition of additional costs to access the 
public market for capital may result in a discontinuity in the supply of capital to growing 
businesses.  Whether the impact is measured from the point of view of the economy, 
generally where 60-80% of net new jobs come from small business, or the point of view 
of the critical high technology sector where 40% of new hires go to small business, the 
potential for significant negative impact is clear. 
Industry Implications. 
 The impact of the imposition of SOX has a tactical significance at the bank level 
but a strategic significance for the banking industry.  The industry is highly regulated and 
is consistent.  From inception, banks grow with the communities they serve, acquiring 
capital to support that growth from a variety of public and private sources.  Typically, the 
bank’s need for capital will outstrip the ability to raise it through local private placement.  
At this point, some number of banks will seek access to the public market to support 
continued growth.  These banks become the next regionals and national market banks, 
utilizing public market equity to fund acquisitions of smaller institutions.  Other banks 
may elect to continue banking in a private structure anticipating acquisition by a larger 
bank in the future.  If as a result of the costs of public market access or the perception of 
those costs, fewer small banks are able to commit to long-term growth, it is possible that 




we reduce the appetite for the acquisition of small banks.  With this reduction in appetite 
will come an associated reduction in franchise value and a concomitant reduction in small 
bank start-ups.  
Managerial Implications.  
 Bank management and the Board will ultimately be faced with the decision to 
absorb the additional costs of public market listing or elect to remain private with 
constrained sources of capital.  If they elect to remain private they will be required to 
develop coping strategies to manage around the capital availability problem.  As the need 
for capital in the business competes with dividend policy the ability to raise capital is 
likely compromised.  If they elect to enter the public market, there are significant costs to 
be borne.  Each of these choices will require focus on capital raising at the likely expense 
of core banking activities.  Coping strategies to reduce costs for small banks would likely 
take the form of reduced hiring for critical positions (lenders) or deferral of deposit 
growth through branching.  Each is expensive for small banks but represents a key 
ingredient for long-term growth.  Consequently, adopting a coping strategy may be 
effective in the short-run with long-run negative impacts.	  
Limitations 
 This study has at least three limitations.  These include: ability to measure SOX 
costs directly, applicability to all banks, and applicability to other national business 
environments. 
Ability to Measure SOX Costs Directly.  
 There is not a single unified accounting entry that may be used to capture the cost 
of SOX.  The Other Non-Interest Expense category (shortened to Other Expense) is used 




as a proxy for SOX costs.  The Other Expense category (FDIC code RIAD 4092), a 
subcategory of Other Non-Interest Expense (FDIC code RIAD 4093) was chosen to 
capture the costs of SOX as it is the accounting category of record for legal, accounting 
and consulting expense.  As noted however, compliance with SOX may require that 
actions be taken which could be reported as expense in other expense categories in the 
chart of accounts for the institution.  Also, accounting practices, though typically 
consistent across banks, may nevertheless allow for varying treatment of the same costs 
in different banks.  Thus it may be the case that we have failed to capture the full SOX 
costs or that we are reflecting increases not solely attributable to SOX.   
Applicability Across All Banks. 
The sample used here is composed solely of financial institutions holding a 
banking charter issued by the federal government of the United States or by a state 
government.  The institutions used in the sample all conduct general banking business 
involving the collection of deposits and making of loans to the public.  Thus the findings 
may not be applicable to specialty organizations holding a bank charter in aid of a 
finance-based business (trust, leasing, credit cards) or to foreign banks that may be 
operating under a different capital regime. 
Applicability To Other National Business Environments. 
While there are international norms for the regulation of banking, the specific 
regulatory environment of each country is unique.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is unique to 
the United States public market, and similar regulations may not exist in whole or in part 
in other countries.  Thus the impacts noted here may not exist for other banks in other 
countries. 




Suggestions for future research 
 	  
 In the examination of the impact of the SOX regulations, significant questions are 
raised: 
 First, as this is a survivor analysis, the decisions of small banks to exit the market 
altogether by being acquired or to further constrain their growth by electing Subchapter S 
federal income tax treatment with its constrained ownership rules are missed.  A more 
complete rendering of the question, “did SOX have an impact on small banks?” can only 
be made by understanding the strategic decisions of all banks.  Future studies may wish 
to examine the motivations behind the decisions to sell or elect Subchapter S. 
 Second, we did not observe the costs found in H1 affecting the pretax income in 
H2.  What served to moderate this impact?  Was there some salutary benefit of SOX that 
offset in some way the cost of compliance?  Did the public market bankers develop a set 
of coping skills?  Or did they benefit from reduced marketing cost as a function of 
reduced growth?  Future research may be able to identify the source of this benefit. 
 Finally, what if any are the impacts of this regulation on the ability of small banks 
to serve the small business?  Is there a permanent reduction of available capital to support 
small business?  While the role of small banks is clear, further research may wish to 
focus on the long-term durability of the business model.  Has there for example, been a 
reduction in the franchise value of small banks? 
 The purpose of the research was to examine the impact of significant regulatory 
legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, on small banks.  Using Transaction Cost Theory we 
focused on the potential for the costs of compliance with SOX to impact the cost 
structure and the decision to pursue the public market for funds.  While the scale of 




banking varies dramatically, the small bank has a significant role in providing funds 
through loans to small business.  Understanding how key regulation might impact small 
banks may usefully inform the debate on bank regulation.  In this way, the role of small 
business in the creation of jobs can be usefully supported. 
  






ESSAY #2:  BANK CAPITAL AND SMALL/NEW BUSINESS LENDING 
Introduction 
 
Has the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) reduced the capital available for small 
business?  SOX imposed a variety of compliance driven activities that have associated 
costs with direct impact upon small financial institutions.  These small banks, sometimes 
referred to as “community banks”, are the primary capital source for American small 
businesses (Sharpe, 1997).    
The question of reduced access to capital is important because small business is 
the primary engine for job creation in the U.S. (Stangler & Litan, 2009).  Small 
businesses employ about half of all private sector employees, pay nearly 45 % of total 
U.S. private payroll, generated 60-80 percent of net new jobs annually over the last 
decade, and hire 40 percent of high technology (scientists, engineers, and computer 
professionals) workers (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and 
International Trade Statistics).    
The role new business plays in the creation of new employment is underscored by 
a recent Kaufman Foundation report.  It states that from 1980 to 2005, nearly all net job 
creation in the United States occurred in firms less than five years old (Stangler & Litan, 
2009).  These firms typically derive their capital requirements from small banks (Berger 
& Udell, 2002; Sharpe, 1997). Thus, the ability of small banks to lend money to 
small/new business is a key driver of the health of the American economy (Brevoort & 




The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
had on the lending relationship between small banks and small/new businesses.  The 
theoretical prism I use to investigate this issue is Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 2003; Schulze, 1992; Wernerfelt, 1984).  Resource Dependence Theory 
(RDT) considers the impact of the availability of key resources on an organization.  RDT 
holds that the availability of key resources largely determines the success of a firm 
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). 
According to current federal regulations, capital, typically in the form of common 
equity, must equal 10% of a bank’s assets (U.S. Federal Reserve, 1989) in order for the 
bank to be deemed well-capitalized.  Thus the amount of capital a bank has determines 
how much lending a bank can do.  Capital for small and new businesses, for the most part 
in the form of loans, comes primarily from small banks (Walker, 1989).  These loans are 
a critical resource in the execution of the small firm’s strategy, providing funds for the 
acquisition of raw materials, parts inventory, and staff (Petersen & Rajan, 1994).   
Using Resource Dependence Theory, I hypothesize that one unintended 
consequence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been to limit small bank capital growth (H1).  
SOX requires additional compliance activities in auditing and audit review for SEC 
reporting (publicly traded) banks.  These activities result in a cost to the bank that if not 
offset by additional sales or margin improvement may thus directly reduce earnings.  The 
first essay found support for the expected increase in costs but not the expected reduction 
in pretax income.  However, the first essay also shows a significant trend away from 
public market membership by small banks in the period post SOX.  This may reflect the 
perception that the public market (SEC regulated major national exchanges) is too 




expensive with the result that a significant number of small banks turn to/or remain in the 
private market (non-SEC regulated).  The private market is both more expensive and 
provides less capacity thus potentially constraining the bank’s access to capital.  
Limiting small bank capital growth impedes a bank’s ability to grow its lendable 
funds, restricting loan volume and reducing the availability of credit to small business. 
Small banks are the primary capital provider for small business (Berger & Udell, 2002), 
and hence a reduction of small bank capital results in a reduction of lending to small 
business.  Thus, I further hypothesize that a second consequence of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act has been to limit availability of credit to small business (H2). The hypotheses are 
tested by comparing a sample of small banks pre and post SOX to a sample of large 
banks. 
  Literature Review 
Resource Dependence Theory. 
Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) gauges the importance of power in 
relationships as a function of resource dependence (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978).  The key 
underlying assumption of RDT is that the success of a firm depends on its ability to 
access resources (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978).   
RDT builds upon the work of Emerson (1962) on power dependency in networks.  
RDT focuses on resource dependency both within and external to the firm.  High 
dependence is perceived as a risk factor and potentially reduces the economic efficiency 
of the firm.  The likely impact of a particular resource dependence is context specific (K. 
D. Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2008). 
Resources may be physical (Williamson, 1975), human (Prescott & Visscher, 
1980) or organizational (Tomer, 1987) in nature.  Physical resources might include 




factory capacity, warehouse space, transportation vehicles, or production machinery.  
Human resources could include trained staff or knowledgeable sales team.  
Organizational resources could include systems and procedures, technological base or 
access to capital.  RDT focuses on those resources that have significant or strategic 
impact, the relative dependency of the firm upon others for the provision of that resource, 
and the tactics that may moderate the impact of the dependency.  
A variety of measures have been identified which may potentially be employed to 
mitigate the dependence of the firm.  They include diversification, which may be 
employed to lessen the dependence upon a particular supplier, marketing channel, or raw 
material (Wernerfelt, 1984).  The general approach to resource dependence mitigation 
depends upon the firm’s ability to source needs from multiple providers (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003).  Scarcity, contractual provisions, or relationships may preclude the use 
of other providers.  In such instances the firm “…will tend to be influenced by those who 
control the resources they require” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003:44). 
RDT applies across a broad spectrum of organizations and resources in a strong-
form and a weak-form.  Schulze (1992:42) summarizes the work on establishing the two 
forms of the general theory: “The weak-form model addresses the issue of creating and 
replacing wealth generating assets.  The strong-form addresses the issues of identification 
of underemployed resources, exploitation and protection of those sources of wealth.”  
Strong-form RDT is most applicable to mature firms whose competitive advantage 
derives from key product differences attributable to particular resources.  Weak-form 
RDT, by contrast, is characterized by resource heterogeneity such that the availability of 
a resource provides the opportunity for temporary efficiency rents (Castanias & Helfat, 




1991; Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1991; Schoemaker, 1990).  It is the creation and 
protection of the resource source that is the focus of management in the weak form of 
RDT.  Thus, for a small business, the resource issue is the acquisition of capital (weak-
form) rather than the allocation of capital among business units, as would be the case for 
an established firm (strong-form).   
Consequently, the key differentiator between the strong and weak-form model is 
the role of power as the isolating or controlling mechanism in the weak-form.  In the 
weak-form case the firm has relatively little power over the source of the needed resource 
whereas in the strong-form case the exercise of power over the resource is the central 
feature (Schulze, 1992).  The relationship between smaller businesses and small banks 
then is consistent with the weak-form model, as underscored by the strategic dependence 
of the firm on the bank. 
The elements of the weak-form model create a lens through which we can see the 
dependence of small firms on small banks as providers of capital as follows:  capital, a 
critical strategic resource for small firms, can at times be unavailable to small firms.  
There is no effective substitute for capital.  A capital shortfall likely has a strategic 
impact as the small firm is unable to pursue investment needs and opportunities such as 
the acquisition of raw materials, equipment, facilities and staff.  Efforts to diversify 
capital sources via relationships with other banks, typically an effective strategy to 
mitigate resource dependence, actually reduce the access and efficiency of capital 
management generally (Berger, Herring, & Szego, 1995; Berger, Klapper, & Udell, 
2001).  This is because the investment that a small bank makes in the relationship with a 
small firm in order to mitigate the problem of informational opacity is typically founded 




on a form of relational contract.  These contracts are defined (Baker et al., 2002:39) as 
“informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships”.  This promise of 
future business is the inducement for performance by the bank.  The result is that only 
about one-third of small firms have a relationship with more than one bank (Berger & 
Udell, 1998).  RDT thus effectively captures the dependence of the small business on the 
small bank as their source of capital, an essential resource.  
How Small Financial Institutions Gain Access to Capital. 
 Banking regulation requires that a financial institution maintain capital as a 
percentage (generally 10%) of its outstanding assets (Capital Maintenance, 12 CFR 325, 
Bank Holding Companies, 12 CFR 225).  This requirement places a direct constraint on 
the growth of loans, as loans to businesses and individuals are the predominant category 
of assets carried on the bank’s balance sheet.  Banks, like all companies, add capital by 
retaining earnings and by accessing the public and private capital markets.  While the 
debt and equity instruments available in each market are similar, pricing and availability 
can vary significantly, with the public market providing the greatest capacity and the best 
pricing (Slee & Paglia, 2010).  Prior to SOX, small banks utilized the private market at 
start up, transitioning to the public market as their growth and demand for lendable funds 
increased (Berger & Udell, 1998).  This process provided capital in amounts and at times 
that supported the banks’ growth and its ability to lend to others.    
For small banks, access to the public market through securities registration and 
offering on a major stock exchange provides two key benefits: reduced costs and 
enhanced flexibility.  Reduced costs can be seen through a hypothetical example of 
financial market cross listing benefits.  Cross listing is the process of offering the shares 




of a firm based in one country for sale in the financial markets of a different country.  
Foreign firms that cross list on major U.S. stock exchanges gain an improvement in cost 
of capital of 70 to 120 basis points over that available in their home countries, while U.S. 
private placements of foreign firm securities represent no savings (Hail & Leuz, 2009).  
Thus the positive spread of 70 to 120 basis points represents the positive value for 
meeting SOX filing requirements versus raising money in the more expensive private 
placement market.  In this example, small banks that raise money in the private sector 
would be expected to pay a premium of 70 to 120 basis points over the public market 
price, reducing the amount of capital raised and subsequently the funds available for 
small companies to borrow. 
 A second benefit of the public market is the range of financing choices and 
providers available.  Public market banks may access the market through equity, debt and 
a range of specialized instruments with hybrid characteristics of debt and equity.  Each of 
these instruments is a form of capital having different costs and features.  Banking 
regulations prescribe how each type of capital instrument should be accounted for and the 
amount of leverage (in terms of deposits) it can support (Bank Holding Companies 12 
CFR 225).  It is this leverage that ultimately provides capital downstream to borrowers by 
allowing the bank to access capital in amounts and at times which reflect attractive 
conditions in the public market and hence to be responsive to the demand for loans.   
 Public market registration provides advantages in accessing each of the 
instruments above.  Access to the public market for equity requires transparency 
(Flannery, 1998).  This is accomplished through the provision of standard reporting and 
compliance activities (now including SOX) built as an add-on to existing Securities 




Exchange Commission (SEC) reporting rules.  SEC registration and hence SOX 
compliance is also useful in accessing the market for debt (Andrade, Bernile, & Hood, 
2009) by establishing a consistent framework for reporting and controls.  Finally, public 
market registration aids in the adoption and affordability of innovative hybrid capital 
instruments as well (Benston, Irvine, Rosenfeld, & Sinkey Jr, 2000).   
The private market alternative to the public capital market is not attractive (Leuz 
et al., 2007).  Small banks, absent the ability to access the public market, generally access 
the equity market through more limited exchanges.  Examples would include the “pink 
sheets”, where a small local or regional market maker provides some matching of buyers 
and sellers; sales to private equity groups; or sales upon demand to the public under an 
exclusion from SEC registration (Engel, Hayes, & Wang, 2007).  These sources 
characteristically are more expensive, provide less capacity, and have uncertain timing.  
The cost, capacity and timing effect each impact the downstream business borrowers in 
the form of higher cost capital, in smaller amounts, in irregular capacities.   
SOX, however, altered the way in which small banks gained access to capital. 
With the passage of SOX, the additional cost incurred in public registration created an 
obstacle to access to the public market impacting the cost, availability and timing of 
capital acquisition, both debt and equity, by small banks.  These additional costs directly 
reduce the earnings of the bank and hence, as valuation in a public equity offering is a 
function of earnings, reduce the amount of equity that can be raised in the public market.  
Alternatively, the reduction of earnings directly reduces the coverage available for debt 
and thus the amount of debt that can be raised in the public market.  As a result, small 
banks must accept increased costs and reduced availability for raising the necessary funds 




or elect to attempt to evade those costs and manage within a smaller private shareholder 
group.  The result is that needed capital is more expensive, more difficult to access or 
both (Slee & Paglia, 2010).  For small businesses that, in turn, depend upon small banks 
as a source of borrowed funds, this translates into reduced borrowing availability or 
increased cost or both. 
As a result the impact of SOX drives the small bank away from the public market 
for capital reducing the availability and increasing the cost of capital to the institution.  
The private market alternative ultimately offers less availability of capital at an increased 
cost.  The ability of the small bank, both public and non-public, to acquire capital to 
support its lending needs is therefore reduced with direct implications for both the cost 
and availability of capital for small company borrowers, thus: 
H1:  The level of Capital held by small listed banks is impacted by SOX such that 
post SOX capital levels are lower than pre SOX for small listed banks as 
compared to large listed banks. 
The Role of Small Financial Institutions in Providing Capital for Small Business. 
Banks generally function as intermediaries to match funds available in the market 
(typically in the form of deposits) with demand by companies for loans (Allen & 
Santomero, 2001).  Among borrowers, the banking market for lending products is 
characterized by information asymmetry resulting in imperfect competition (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984).  Large borrowers have significant history and resources and achieve 
transparency by producing (often in connection with other regulatory requirements) the 
necessary information (managerial accounting data, audited financial statements) to allow 
broad based third party analysis by investment analysts as required by public company 




reporting (Bolton & Freixas, 2000).  Large borrowers, by meeting the standard for public 
company reporting, can access the capital markets through the largest financial 
institutions and the public markets (Bolton & Freixas, 2000). 
  Conversely, small borrowers typically are less transparent and hence represent 
more risk (Berger & Udell, 1995).  While the increased risk ultimately entails additional 
cost for the small borrower, such borrowers also face a problem of capital availability.  
Small businesses’ inability to access the public financial markets and their consequential 
reliance on bank capital is documented by Walker (1989).  From the lender’s point of 
view, the market for small company loans suffers the potential for adverse selection and 
adverse incentive (and their interaction with pricing) and may result in an equilibrium 
characterized by credit rationing (Arnold & Riley, 2009; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).    
The dependence by small business on small banks is well documented.  Berger 
and Udell (2002:32) observe: “These firms simply do not have access to public capital 
markets.”  In contrast with their large bank counterparts, small financial institutions 
typically provide capital support to small businesses through a relationship-lending 
model.  In this model banks acquire information over time through contact with the firm, 
its owner, and its local community on a variety of dimensions and use this information in 
their decisions about the availability and terms of credit to the firm (Almazan, 2002; 
Berger & Udell, 2002).    
The costs of information gathering in this model are balanced by higher 
borrowing costs to the borrower and expected loyalty from the borrower such that small 
businesses attempting to access multiple borrowers typically suffer higher costs and 
reduced availability of credit (Dell'Ariccia & Marquez, 2004; Petersen & Rajan, 1994).  




These relationships are particularly important in times of general credit constraint 
(Petersen & Rajan, 1995).    
This preference of small companies for small banks is reflected in the geography 
of banking, such that for individuals and small businesses banking markets are basically 
local in nature rather than regional or national (Sharpe, 1997).  With the advent of 
interstate banking the competition for deposits is nationwide, but recent studies show 
that, if anything, the significance of distance in the lending relationship is increasing 
(Brevoort & Hannan, 2006).  This means that the local small bank remains the lender of 
choice for most small business. 
RDT provides the framework in which to understand the relationship of small 
business to small bank.  This relationship is characterized by dependence and centers on 
the provision of a critical resource.  Small businesses, lacking transparency and unable to 
afford the systems and external reviews that provide it, must depend upon small banks for 
funds in the form of loans.  Before the passage of SOX, financial institutions, large and 
small, brought on to their balance sheets available deposits in their market, in turn 
providing these funds to their relevant borrowers (Allen & Santomero, 2001).  I 
hypothesize that, post SOX, the capital and hence the capacity of small banks to accept 
deposits was constrained.  This reduction in the level of capital in small banks limits the 
bank’s balance sheet, and hence the amount of loan funding they can provide for the 
needs of small businesses.  Thus: 
H2: The level of small business lending by small listed banks is impacted by SOX 
such that post SOX small bank lending to small business is lower as compared to 
large listed banks. 






 A quasi-experimental pre-test, post-test design (Shadish et al., 2002) was used.  
Unlike a true experiment, in a quasi-experimental structure the treatment group cannot be 
manipulated by the observer (Shadish et al., 2002:159).  As SOX was enacted in 2002 
with full effect over a span of several years, the paper will focus upon the period pre and 
post-SOX providing a break for the extended period of implementation: the treatment 
period.  Consequently, data from two periods was used: period 1 includes pre-SOX data 
from 1998 – 2000 and period 2 includes post-SOX data from 2004 – 2006.  The treatment 
is the passage of SOX.  In each hypothesis, the treatment group is expected to be affected 
by the passage of SOX, with the potential for differing effects among subgroups.  
Data Sources. 
 The data used to test our hypotheses comes from a public data source, the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Central Data Repository.  FFIEC is 
an umbrella agency that acts as a formal interagency body of the U.S. Government 
coordinating regulation by the various agencies responsible for the oversight, monitoring, 
and regulation of financial institutions.  The Central Data Repository holds data 
accumulated from filings mandated by regulation.  Banks in the United States, without 
regard to the source of their charter, must submit quarterly information thru their 
regulator (typically the U. S. Federal Reserve and/or the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation) to the Central Data Repository.  A single reporting format is used providing 
for consistency of accounting definition and measurement across reporting companies 
and across time and avoiding the problem of source induced data variation (Berger & 
Mester, 1997).  These reports are extensive, capturing balance sheet and income 




statement information in significant detail, with memo fields for comments and 
explanations.  This database has been used extensively for efficiency analysis of U.S. 
banks (Barr et al., 2002; Siems & Barr, 1998). 
Samples and Sample Size. 
 The treatment group for H1 and H2 of Essay #2 consists of a random sample of 
117 small financial institutions and large financial institutions that were operating 
throughout the pre-SOX and the post-SOX period.  The approach employed defines small 
banks as having greater than $300 million but less than $500 million in total assets and in 
business for more than three years.  
 Large banks are defined as having greater than $2 billion in assets.  All 
institutions in the study are public reporting institutions and thus subject to SOX.  All 
banks, large and small, used in the analysis are chartered financial institutions with 
operations in the United States.  
The term bank is applied to any organization holding a charter to conduct banking 
business.  We are concerned specifically with those institutions that conduct deposit 
taking and lending activities.  Many of these organizations however, hold a charter as 
incidental to a financing service not involved in raising funds and making loans.  Thus we 
have excluded from the sample a number of banks whose activities are inconsistent with 
small business service.  Credit card banks that exist solely to conduct credit card 
operations, trust banks whose principal activities are custodianship and investment 
advice, and subsidiary banks of foreign institutions which exist to conduct heavy 
equipment leasing have been removed from the database.  In each case these “banks” 




have a different cost structure and operational focus in their principal line of business and 
do not provide funding for small business.  
 Additionally, banks less than three years old typically are operating under original 
charter restrictions (DeYoung, 2003).  Such restrictions may include, for example, the 
requirement to maintain additional capital during the first three years (DeYoung, 2003).  
These restrictions are intended to provide a low-risk operating environment during the 
start-up period by limiting the types of risks the institution may undertake.  Care is taken 
to ensure that sufficient capital is raised at the outset to support the operational plan for 
this period thus eliminating the need to access any market for capital.  Consequently, 
banks less than three years old have been excluded from consideration.  Likewise, those 
banks that have elected Subchapter S treatment for federal taxation have been excluded 
from the samples.  This provision of the tax code limits a bank to 100 shareholders and 
consequently precludes effective use of the public capital markets.  Finally, throughout 
the period of study banks have acquired other banks and in turn been acquired.  As the 
study focuses upon the actions of survivor institutions, those institutions that are acquired 
in a merger transaction during the study period have been excluded. 
 As a result the following types of banks were excluded: 
1. Credit Card Banks 
2. Trust Banks 
3. Foreign subsidiaries engaged in leasing 
4. New banks (3 years old or less) 
5. Federal Tax structure Subchapter S banks 
6. Banks acquired in the course of the study. 




 Based upon the recommendations of Hair et al, (2010, pp. 5,171) and Cohen 
(1992, p. 158), an initial random sample of n=120 was used for this research.  In 
subsequent review of the data one bank that did not report any Business Loans was 
eliminated, as were two outlier banks.  This resulted in a final sample of n=117.  
Dependent Variables. 
 The dependent variables are drawn from the FFIEC database outlined previously.  
Dependent variables used are from U.S. national databases and have been consistently 
used for analysis of banking companies (Calomiris & Karceski, 2000; Madura & Wiant, 
1994; Steven J. Pilloff, 1996; Steven J.  Pilloff & Rhoades, 2002; Rhoades, 1998; 
Srinivasan & Wall, 1992).  The FFIEC database line reference code is provided in 
parentheses after the data element name.   
For Hypothesis 1, the dependent variable is TOTAL EQUITY CAPITAL 
(RCFD3210).  This is the total of the shareholders’ equity accounts of the bank and 
reflects the total of Tier 1 (most favored) capital available to the bank.  Any capital 
obtained in the market plus any earnings are added to this capital account.  While there 
are a number of measures of bank capital and near capital, this account is the primary 
measure of core capital availability and has been used in prior banking studies (Aysun & 
Hepp, 2011).  The ratio of post-SOX three-year TOTAL EQUITY CAPITAL divided by 
pre-SOX three-year TOTAL EQUITY CAPITAL is used to control for relative size effect 
and normalize all data to a start point value of 1. 
 In Hypothesis 2 the dependent variable is BUSINESS LOANS (RCON1763). 
This is the amount of the commercial and industrial lending (in dollars U.S.) that the 
institutions make available to businesses.  This is a distinct sub category within the 




lending accounts and is used in other studies to approximate business loans (Craig & 
Thomson, 2003).  The ratio of post-SOX three-year BUSINESS LOANS divided by pre-
SOX three-year BUSINESS LOANS is used.  The post/pre ratio is used to control for 
relative size effect and normalize all data to a start point value of 1. 
Independent Variable. 
 The following variable is used:  
 BANK SIZE is coded 0 for large banks and 1 for small banks; Bank size has been 
used in prior studies (Berger et al., 2005; Cyree et al., 2005). 
Control	  Variables	  
 While the banking business model is highly consistent across institutions, there 
are differences in charter source and structure, which must be considered.  The potential 
impact of key structural differences will be controlled for through the use of the 
following control variables: BANK CHARTER is the type of charter, state or national, 
the bank holds under which it does business (Cyree et al., 2000) and will be coded 0 for 
state and 1 for national; MULTIBANK HOLDING COMPANY captures the format of 
the bank structure whether single bank or multi-bank holding company (Thomson, 1991) 
and is coded 0 if single variable or 1 for multi-bank holding company. 
Analysis. 
For H1 and H2 hierarchical regression (Edmondson & McManus, 2007) is used.  
In this study, through a series of steps, first the effect of the control variables, and next 
the main effect variable reflecting bank size were entered.  A negative effect upon the 
accumulation of small bank capital (H1) and business lending (H2) post-SOX was 
anticipated.  Thus if beyond the variance explained by the control variables, the main 




effect variable adds to the variance explained with the appropriate sign and is significant, 
we can conclude that the hypotheses are supported.    
In the conduct of the analysis two conditions were encountered that required 
attention in the model.  First, the balance sheet and associated income statement values 
vary significantly between “small” and “large” firms within the banking industry, which 
obscures the impact of a change in values within the small firm structure.  In order to 
mitigate this, both the level of equity capital and the level of business loans for an 
institution were indexed to the level of assets for that institution.  Second, large banks are 
frequent acquirers of small institutions and thus the addition of acquired assets to normal 
same-store growth further obscures underlying trends when compared between the two 
periods.  The resulting data distribution is peaked with a positive skew.  Following Hair 
et al (2010:80), the data was transformed by taking its natural logarithm. 
Threats to Inference. 
 The evaluation of threats to inference followed Shadish et al (2002:55).  Any 
consideration of banking institutions over a multi-year period raises concerns over 
potential changes in the underlying data.  The following threats are of concern due to the 
structure of the experiment and the time periods under study and these threats apply to 
each of the hypotheses.  Of particular initial concern is history, as there were other 
“treatment-like” events occurring during the time period under examination.  More 
specifically, the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 extended to banks the ability 
to elect Subchapter S status for assessment of federal taxes effective in 1997.  A 
significant number of banks converted to Subchapter S status (FDIC database).  These 
banks when compared to non-Subchapter S banks are smaller, slower growing, more 




rural institutions with less commercial and industrial lending (Cyree et al., 2005).  To 
control for this possible confounding effect, Subchapter S banks have been removed from 
the study.   
In order to provide time for the full effect of implementation of SOX, there is a 
four-year break between the periods under measurement.  As a result, maturation, the 
process of change that an organization undergoes with the passage of time, was 
considered as a potential threat.  This is the case of “growing older, hungrier, wiser, 
stronger, or more experienced” (Shadish et al., 2002).  Among businesses generally this 
may include changes in business model, level of vertical integration and product line.  
The regulated nature of banking, however, ensures that the business model is relatively 
unchanging, except for balance sheet growth.  The growth rate for financial institutions 
from 12/31/2000 to 12/31/2004 averaged 7.74% annually (FDIC Data Base).  
Consequently, it is unlikely that a small bank could grow to the size of a large bank, 
mitigating that threat.  Berger et al. (1995) note the relatively high leverage ratios 
permitted by regulation as evidence of the highly controlled business model, further 
serving to mitigate threats to inference. 
Findings 
 
Table 1 reports the minima, maxima, means and standard deviations of all 
variables used.  While both large and small bank equity capital (taken as a percent of 
assets) grew, the mean for large banks reflects growth in excess of that of the small 
banks.  Business Loans however show large banks reducing business lending generally 
while small banks reflect a significant increase.  Table 2 reports the correlations of the 
variables.  The correlations show that capital growth is not significantly correlated with 




bank size, however business loans are significant at he p,.001 level.  Table 3 reports the 
results of the hierarchical linear regression on capital growth, and Table 4 reports the 
results of the hierarchical linear regression on business lending.  No Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) exceeded 1.2, and no Tolerance level was less than .8, showing 













Equity Capital Growth. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that post-SOX capital levels (the capital asset ratio) is lower 
post-SOX than pre-SOX for small listed banks as compared to large listed banks.  This 
hypothesis was tested using hierarchical linear regression in a two-step model (Models 
1A & 1B) as shown in Table 3.  Model 1A included the control variables that reflect 
holding company structure and whether the bank has a state or federal banking charter. 
Model 1B included the main effect variable Bank Size and was not found to be 
significant.  The R2 values and R2 change values were not significant for this model. 
Thus Hypothesis 1 was not supported, as the capital levels for small listed banks 
were not negatively impacted by SOX as compared to large listed banks. 
 






Business Loan Growth. 
Hypothesis 2 states that post-SOX small bank lending to businesses is lower than 
pre-SOX lending, relative to large banks.  This hypothesis was also tested using 
hierarchical linear regression in a two-step model (Models 2A & 2B) as shown in Table 




4.  Model 2A included the control variables for holding company structure and banking 
charter issuer.  This model was not significant.    
Model 2B included the main effect variable Bank Size and was significant.  The 
overall F for the model was significant at the p < .05 level, and the F for change was 
significant at the p < .001 level.  However, the variable carried the wrong sign, thus 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported, as the business loan growth for small listed banks was 
not slower in the post-SOX period than pre-SOX as compared to large listed banks.  In 
fact, business loans by small banks increased markedly, while business loans by large 
banks contracted.  Taken together with the increase in capital, the findings suggest that 
small banks grew capital about 9% over the study period while growing business lending 
by 15 % while large banks grew capital by 14% while reducing business lending by 16%.     
 







This study commenced by questioning whether the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley 
resulted in consequences for small banks and small businesses.  In a previous study, the 
direct cost impacts of SOX on large and small banks were examined, concluding that the 
cost was significantly greater for small banks relative to large banks.  The expectation of 
this cost disadvantage may have affected small banks in several ways.  It may have 




dissuaded small banks from going public, convinced small public banks to go private or 
created the need for extensive coping behavior to avoid the continuing cost burden.   
 We theorized that the practical effect would be to reduce capital available to 
small banks and by extension to reduce lending to small companies.  The typical growth 
pattern for a small bank is fairly linear.  In a growing market, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to raise sufficient capital through earnings and local investors.  The bank then 
faces a strategic growth choice to: 1) seek access to public funding, to grow capital and in 
turn the balance sheet to serve its growing customers, 2) remain privately held with the 
potential for diminishing capital growth and hence restricted future growth, or 3) seek 
sale of the institution to another bank at what is likely the best value on a time adjusted 
basis. 
Consistent with Resource Dependence Theory, we expected to find limitations 
upon the sourcing of capital by small banks in the period after the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We had hypothesized (H1) that capital growth post-SOX would be 
less than pre-SOX for small banks, relative to large banks.  Capital, in the form of equity, 
serves several core purposes for the bank.  First it is the bank’s cushion with which to 
withstand losses taken in the lending program.  The ability to efficiently replenish that 
capital reserve in the aftermath of losses determines the ability and timing of a bank’s 
return to its principal role as lender.  The amount of lending a bank can do at any time is 
determined in relationship to that bank’s equity capital.  Constraint of capital growth acts 
directly as a regulatory constraint on loan growth (Benston et al., 2000; Berger et al., 
1995).  Therefore, whether we consider the impact of bank capital shortfall on lending in 
the normal course of business or at a pivotal time in an economic recovery when capital 




is critical to the return of jobs to the workplace, it is clear that the potential for damage 
exists.  Small banks are the key source of capital, in the form of business loans, for small 
businesses (Berger & Udell, 2002).  Thus, this resource constraint has the potential for 
down-stream implications, and we further hypothesized (H2) that small business lending 
for the post-SOX period would be less than pre-SOX. Neither Hypothesis 1 nor 
Hypothesis 2 was empirically supported.  Our results show that indeed capital 
accumulation by small banks was not significantly constrained in the period following the 
adoption of SOX.  Likewise, small business lending was not similarly reduced; in fact, it 
increased markedly, while large bank business lending decreased.  Resolving the ultimate 
deployment of the capital raised by large banks is beyond the scope of this study, but will 
provide an important element of framework for understanding the relative growth in the 
level business lending nationally.  
While the study showed no short term impairment of capital or lending capacity 
for small listed banks, the number of small listed banks was reduced and the ability of the 
non-listed small banks to fill the void remains to be analyzed.  Thus, the long-term 
implications for the pool of capital may still be in question, as there are two potential 
impacts identified in the study: 
1) The number of small financial institutions with access to capital to 
support long-term growth is reduced, and 
2) A source of long-term funding for small banks in general is now more 
costly, with implications for the perceived value of small banking 
franchises generally.  




Managerial Implications.  
This study has two implications for managers.  First, if the true costs or 
perceptions of the likely costs of SOX compliance have raised the bar for public market 
access, small banks will likely, in increasing numbers, pursue one of the two non-public 
alternative strategies.  Small banks can elect to accept a slower growth strategy, relying 
solely upon internally generated funds to support lending needs.  Alternatively, they can 
choose to be acquired by a larger bank thus avoiding the challenge of capital sourcing.  
Neither strategy maximizes earnings or provides for the needs of customer businesses. 
In both instances, each of these non-public strategies represents a reduced value-
creation opportunity (Ayogu & Dezhbakhsh, 2004).  Hence they may reduce the value of 
non-public small banks generally, further exacerbating the task of capital sourcing.  At a 
minimum it suggests increased difficulty in raising sufficient capital to fund the growing 
needs of customers, including small and start-up businesses. 
Second, while reduced capital may be a tactical constraint for small banks with 
implications for ultimate value, it could very well spell the difference between success 
and failure for small/start-up companies dependent upon the small bank for support (Beck 
& Demirguc-Kunt, 2006).  Small companies have traditionally depended upon a single 
bank for their lending needs, building upon the relationship to secure needed finance 
because attempting to access additional banks for capital has resulted in reduced access 
and efficiency of capital management (Berger & Humphrey, 1991; Berger et al., 2001).  
Thus, small business managers, in planning their growth, now face increased challenges 
in sourcing capital in amounts and at the times needed.  





 Capital is drawn to the banking industry seeking a return.  The banking model has 
been a stable one producing new firms almost solely by start-up.  Banking capacity 
results from the creation and growth of these new banking firms.  These firms, as they 
grow, typically reach a decision point regarding the ultimate source of their capital and 
some will elect public market sourcing.  As the data shows, small banks are generally 
private and large banks are generally public.  If the costs or the perceptions of those costs 
associated with the decision to go public make that alternative unattractive, we risk 
creating a discontinuity in scale.  If the number of banks in that middle ground that have 
made the decision to become a public company is reduced, then the capacity of the 
industry to absorb small banks is reduced.  This lack of strategic alternatives for the 
banking model may reduce the capital competing for new banking licenses. 
Public Policy Implications. 
 Small/new firms have been the central driver of net new job creation in the U.S. 
(Stangler & Litan, 2009).  Consequently, a reduction in small business lending can only 
serve to slow the pace of economic growth.  It may have its greatest impact at times when 
the economy is most vulnerable, that is, speeding up the downturns and slowing the 
recovery.  The challenge for regulators generally will be to preserve the safeguards for 
the individual investor while minimizing the impact to the economy overall.  Programs of 
phased implementation, reduced compliance burdens and alternative regulatory regimes 
may offer an approach more sensitive to the administrative capacity of small business.    





 This study has at least two limitations.  These include: applicability to all banks, 
and applicability to other national business environments.  
Applicability across all banks. 
The sample used here is composed solely of financial institutions holding a 
banking charter issued by the federal government of the United States or by a state 
government.  The institutions used in the sample all conduct general banking business 
involving the collection of deposits and making of loans to the public.  Thus the findings 
may not be applicable to specialty organizations holding a bank charter in aid of a 
finance-based business (trust, leasing, credit cards) or to foreign banks that may be 
operating under a different capital regime. 
Applicability to other national business environments. 
While there are international norms for the regulation of banking, the specific 
regulatory environment of each country is unique.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is unique to 
the United States public market, and similar regulations may not exist in whole or in part 
in other countries.  Thus the impacts noted here may not exist for other banks in other 
countries. 
  




Suggestions for future research 
 
In this paper we examine the potential for unintended impact of regulation upon small 
banks with the reduction of loan volume for small business.  Two fruitful questions are 
raised by this research: 
First, we specifically structured this analysis as a survivor analysis; that is, we 
retained in the general pool only those banks that existed throughout the three-year pre-
SOX period as well as the three-year post-SOX period.  We excluded from consideration 
those banks that elected United States Federal Income Tax status S, as they are precluded 
from accessing the public market and so do not have to comply with SOX.  Likewise, we 
excluded any small banks that elected to be sold to another bank even though they may 
have existed for some of the post-SOX three-year period.  Each of these decisions is a 
strategic one with implications for the institution’s shareholders, and, as they affect the 
institution’s ability to garner funds, they also affect the availability of loanable funds to 
small business.  Future studies may wish to examine the role of impending SOX 
compliance on the strategic decision to elect Sub-S tax treatment or to put the bank up for 
sale. Such studies would provide additional insights into the total impact of SOX on 
banking. 
The purpose in this analysis was to provide clarity on the critical linkages 
between capital formation for small banks and lending support for small companies. As 
small companies play a key role in the creation of jobs in the United States, as well as 
throughout the world (Baas & Schrooten, 2006), understanding the role of their leading 
financial institutions in providing capital to business could prove useful to banking and 
securities regulators as they promulgate banking and stock exchange regulations 




(Garneau & Shahid, 2009).  In this way unintended consequences with significant 
negative downstream effects for small companies might be avoided.   
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